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MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN AND HIS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
Francis P. McQuade and Alexander T. Kardos*
On September 29, 1956, William Joseph Brennan, Junior,
associate justice of the New Jersey Supreme- Court, received an
apparently casual telephone call from .Attorney General Herbert
Brownell, Jr., inviting him to come to Washington, D.C., the
following day. The reason for. the invitation was not disclosed
at that time. The next day, -a rather surprised Mr. Brennan was.
informed that he was President Eisenhower's choice to be Associ-
ate Justice of the United States Supreme Court; His acceptance
was immediate, and he took his oath of office on October 16,
1956.
I. THE EARLY YEARS
William J. Brennan, Jr., was born in Newark, New Jersey, on
April 25, 1906, one of eight children of Irish-Catholic immi-
grants. His father had come from Country Roscommon, Ireland,
as a youth of twenty in 1893, and had worked as a coal shoveler,
in a brewery and as a metal polisher. Early in his life, the senior
Brennan came into contact with the rapidly growing organized
labor movement and regarded it with a sincere sympathy which
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ultimately developed into a life-long interest. He was business
manager of the union local and served as delegate to the Essex
County Trades and Labor Council. His reputation for honesty
and integrity grew. In 1916 he was appointed to the Newark
police board by Republican Mayor Raymond, an appointment
all the more unusual because the elder Brennan, a staunch
Democrat, had advised Republican Mayor Raymond that he
had voted against him in the most recent election. His fairness
and sense of justice brought him popular acclaim; and in 1917,
running as a representative of labor, he was elected a Newark
City Commissioner and Director of Public Safety. His office
directed the police, fire, and license departments, normally
tempting fields of public corruption and graft. His strict attention
to duty and his utter hatred of dishonesty and graft brought him
public gratitude. He was re-elected three times, serving the public
to the day he died. This. innate sense of justice and fair play was
the younger Brennan's birthright and legacy.
As a boy, William, Jr., quickly learned the necessity for
honesty and integrity and the value of discipline and hard work.
In Newark, he made change for passengers waiting for trolley
cars, worked as a "grease monkey" in a garage and gasoline
filling station, and delivered milk in a horse-drawn wagon. He
worked at various odd jobs before and after school, on week-
ends, and during the summer. His schooling and education, how-
ever, were not neglected. Indeed, they were emphasized by the
elder Brennan. William, Jr., attended parochial school for three
or four years, then public school in Newark, graduating from
Barringer High School with an excellent record. He attended
the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce of the University
of Pennsylvania graduating with honors and a degree in Eco-
nomics in 1928.
That same year he married Marjorie Leonard of East Orange,
New Jersey, and began studies at Harvard Law School. Financial
difficulties were partially met by Mrs. Brennan's remaining at
home in New Jersey and working as a secretary and proofreader
on a local newspaper. The Brennans' financial difficulties in-
creased in 1930, when the elder Brennan died, leaving only a
very small estate. However, a scholarship was obtained from
the alumni foundation at Harvard, primarily on the basis of Mr.
Brennan's fine scholastic record and his genuine need for fin-
ancial assistance. One year later, in 1931, Mr. Brennan grad-
uated high in his law class.
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II. EARLY LAW PRACTICE AND MILITARY SERVICE
Upon graduation from law school, Mr. Brennan became
associated with the law firm of Pitney, Hardin and Skinner, a
leading Newark firm, where he had worked during a prior sum-
mer vacation. He was a law clerk there for the required period
and was admitted to the New Jersey bar as an attorney in 1932
and as a counsellor in 1935. He rose rapidly, gaining consider-
able experience in corporate law and in management-labor pro-
blems and was made a partner in 1937. All appeared serene;
there were then two healthy children in Brennan's household.
Mr. Brennan's keen analytical mind, awesome discipline, and
prodigious capacity for sustained work were winning him a fine
reputation in the legal profession.
World War II, however, brought about an abrupt and tem-
porary digression from Mr. Brennan's schedule. He entered the
Army in July 1942, and was assigned to legal work in the Ord-
nance Department, where his knowledge and experience in labor
law proved of great help. He was awarded the Legion of Merit
for his contribution to the Army and Air Force Procurement
programs; and, in September 1945, he was separated from the
armed services, a full colonel.
III. THE JUDGE
He returned to private law practice in Newark with his original
firm, now called Pitney, Hardin, Ward and Brennan, and re-
sumed the comparatively even tenor of private life. However, his
abilities and potentialities were not long unnoticed. In January
1949, Republican Governor Driscoll of New Jersey appointed
him a Judge in the Law Division of the New Jersey Superior
Court; and in September 1950, he was moved up to the Appellate
Division of the New Jersey Superior Court, where he served
until March 1952. At that time he was appointed by Republican
Governor Driscoll to the New Jersey Supreme Court, the highest
court in the State.
During this period of Justice Brennan's career, he evidenced a
notable interest in the movement for judicial reform in New
Jersey and in support of the major changes brought about by
the adoption of the new state constitution in 1947. He ardently
supported the streamlined and subsequently highly successful
procedural changes in the New Jersey judiciary whereby docket
congestion was lessened and delays in the administration of
1958]
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justice were minimized. In Mr. Brennan's own opinion,' his
interest in court reform and his advocacy of more enlightened
trial procedures to avoid court congestion were probable factors
in his appointment to the United States Supreme Court. In any
event, when Mr. Brennan took his seat on the bench of the
United States Supreme Court on October 16, 1956, it had 457
cases pending on its regular docket and 288 cases pending on
its miscellaneous docket. This constituted the heaviest Supreme
Court docket in modem times.
Public Reaction
Efforts are naturally made to classify and categorize a newly
appointed judge as to his political leanings, school of juris-
prudence, social philosophy, economic theories, governmental
policies, and other characteristics. Justice Brennan was promptly
labelled "a moderate liberal and a strict judge,"2 "a foe of the
law's delays,' 3 "a defender of civil rights,"4 and a host of other
names, alm6st all of them laudatory.5
Arthur Krock expressed his opinion of the new Justice thus:
In William Joseph Brennan, Jr.;. of 'Newark, NJ., the Presi-
dent found a nominee for membership on the Supreme Court
with an unusal number of qualifications for the office.
Foremost among these, with respect to the judicial function,
are that the new appointee is an experienced judge whose work
has been generally applauded by the bar, was an outstanding
trial lawyer, and is only fifty years old.6
Continuing his article, Mr. Krock relayed the following state-
ments, which he acquired through personal interviews. Governor
Meyner said of the new Justice:
He is very able indeed . .. a sound liberal of the highest per-
sonal character and with great intellectual drive . . . . [B]ut
I suspect his opinions will not be quite as "middle-of-the-road"
as some Republicans seem to think.
And Bernard Shanley was equally enthusiastic in his praise.
He is extraordinarily brilliant; he has a tremendous personality;
and he is genuine from top to toe - a quality that stands out
in him as it does in the President.7
N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1956, p. 19, col. 3.
Id., Sept. 30, 1956, § I p. 76, col. 6.
3 Id., Oct. 2, 1956, p. 34, col. 5.
4 Id., Oct. 7, 1956, § 4 p. 8, col. 5.
5 For sympathetic presentation of Mr. Justice Brennan's capacities and ac-
complishments, see Jack Alexander, Mr. Justice from New Jersey, Saturday Evening
Post, Sept. 28, 1957, p. 25. This article and the reports in the N.Y. Times form the
basis of the biographical sketch.
6 N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1956, p. 34, col. 5.
7I Ibid.
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An editorial in the New York Times referred to the. newly
nominated Associate Justice:
Justice Brennan, a man of high repute and recognized achieve-
ment, may go to his new post with the knowledge that he owes
no service to anything but his own conscience. His record, even
his comparative obscurity, promises well.-He will take his seat,
two weeks hence, amid general goodwill, and when the Senate
meets again will be confirmed, we imagine, without contro-
versy.8
Life magazine, in an article, A Fine Judge Ready for His
Biggest Job, indicated complete approval of the appointment.
At fifty, Justice Brennan is the Supreme Court's youngest mem-
ber and he brings to the Court one of the keenest, quickest
judicial minds in the country. The. opinions he has delivered in
his seven years on the New. Jersey bench are clear" forceful
and middle-of-the-road . . . . Brennan has been America's-
hardest working crusader for speedier trial procedure, having
helped institute a pre-trial conference system that reduced his
state's huge backlog of court cases to the point where it is now
a national model.9
Time magazine described Justice Brennan as "hard working,
respected by lawyers, who have often found themselves dis-
comfited because [he] 'sometimes catches you off-guard.' " Time
went on to say that, "His opinions are clear, thoughtful, moder-
ate; his mind is quick and sharp." 10
The U. S. News and World Report also praised the appoint-
ment in an article, An Experienced Judge for the Supreme
Court:
William Joseph Brennan, Jr., has compiled a record- both
as a lawyer and as a judge- of solid rather than spectacular
achievement. As an Associate Justice of the New Jersey Su-
preme Court, he has been credited with combining painstaking
preparation of opinions with independent judgment. Mr.
Brennali has' also given much attention to the problem of
speeding up court procedure.
In some decisions handed down by the New Jersey Supreme
Court, Justice Brennan has been outspoken in defending the
rights of citizens. As a lawyer, he advocated compulsory arbi-
tration in strikes against public utilities - a procedure that since
has beeni, written into New- Jersey law. . -
A close study of the career of the new appointee to the
Court indicates that he cannot be counted on to join either a
"liberal" or "conservative" bloc on the nation's highest tribunal.
One Administration official who has known Justice Brennan
for many'years concedes that he is "a man With a lot of progies-
8 Id., Oct. 1, 1956, p. 26, col. 1. -
9 Life, Oct. 29, 1956, p. 116.
10 Time, Oct. 8, 1956, p. 25.
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sive ideas." But he adds: "I would say that Mr. Brennan's
beliefs are very close to President Eisenhower's on many issues.
I would call him a middle-of-the-roader." l
The only voice raised in public objection was that of the late
Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, of Wisconsin, whose objection to
his appointment was based upon two speeches made while
Mr. Brennan was still a New Jersey justice. 12
IV. His LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
Undoubtedly, the most accurate source of the true nature of
Mr. Justice Brennan's legal characteristics and jurisprudential
leanings are: first, his decisions in the New Jersey courts; second,
his written statements and public addresses; and third, his deci-
sions as Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
These sources indicate his basic legal premises, outline his funda-
mental juridical principles, and provide for a general prediction
of his approach to future questions. Obviously, only the high-
lights can be presented here, but the following selections should
prove sufficient to provide a fair and comprehensive view of his
legal outlook on both substantive rights and adjective remedies.
They will be arranged under appropriate headings, giving first
his decisions as a New Jersey judge and then, at greater length,
the important decisions he has participated in thus far as a
Supreme Court Justice.
A. SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS
1. Civil Liberties
Mr. Justice Brennan is widely known as "a defender of civil
rights."' 3
(a) Freedom of Religion. He supports the classic separative
concept and upholds the constitutional division between Church
and State. The Nation said of him: "The new Justice is a
Roman Catholic- the first to serve on the Court since Frank
Murphy. On the New Jersey tribunal, he proved as rigorous as
his co-religionist was in maintaining the constitutional barrier
between Church and State."' 4 In Tudor v. Board of Education,l5
he concurred in the opinion that distribution of Bibles by a
11 U.S. News and World Report, Oct. 12, 1956, p. 70.
12 Hearings on Nomination of William J. Brennan, Jr. Before the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1957).
13 Huston, Portrait of the Supreme Court, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1956 § 4, p. 8,
col. 5 Huston adds: "Only time and his future conduct can tell whether he will
become an addition to the group of so-called 'liberals.'" Ibid.
14 183 Nation 299-300 (1956).
Ii 14 N.J. 31, 100 A.2d 857 (1953).
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Bible society through the public school system was violative of
the religion clause of the first amendment as incorporated into
the fourteenth amendment.
The question of a conflict of loyalties to his Church and to
his office was raised in the Senate hearings on his appointment, 6
and his honest and straightforward response brought praise from
everyone.17
(b) Freedom of Speech and Press. His position on constitu-
tional guarantees of free speech and freedom of the press follows
generally accepted principles. The guarantees against prior re-
straint were extended to a burlesque show in Adams Theatre Co.
v. Keenan,' wherein Brennan stated:
The performance of a play or show, whether burlesque or
other kind of theatre, is a form of speech and prima facie
expression protected by the State and Federal Constitutions,
and thus only in exceptional cases subject to previous restraint
by means of withholding of a theatre license or otherwise.' 9
In United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Raritan,20 Bren-
nan distinguished the guarantees as inapplicable to purely com-
mercial advertising. He pointed out "that these guaranties impose
no such restraint upon governmental regulation of purely com-
mercial advertising."'21 He concurred with the court in City of
Absecon v. Vettese, 2 which stated: "The free press is a bulwark
of our democratic way of life and courts must be ever vigilant to
curb insidious as well as candid attempts to restrict its vital
public functions. 23
Probably his most controversial decision on freedom of ex-
pression was delivered in the obscenity cases of June 1957,
Roth v. United States and Alberts v. California,24 wherein he
announced a new rule for determining violations of freedom of
the press.
16 See note 12 supra at 32-34.
17 66 Commonweal 4 (1957).
18 12 N.J. 267, 96 A.2d 519 (1953).
19 Id. at 520.
20 11 N.J. 144, 93 A.2d 362 (1952).
21 Id. at 366.
22 13 NJ. 581, 100 A.2d 750 (1953).
23 Id. at 752.
24 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Chief Justice Warren, in a separate opinion, concurred
in the result, expressing doubts as to the wisdom of the broad language used in
the majority opinion. Justice Harlan concurred in Alberts but dissented in Roth, on
the ground that the regulation of obscenity by federal statute was beyond federal
power. Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, dissented in both cases, stating
that both the federal and state statutes were violative of the constitutional guaranties
of free speech and press.
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In the Rotht case, the petitioner was convicted of mailing
obscene material in violation of the federal obscenity statute. In
Alberts the appellant -vas convicted of keeping for sale obscene
books and publishing an obscene advertisement of them, in viola-
tion of a state statute.
Emphasizing that historically the "unconditional phrasing of
the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utter-
ance,"2 5 the Court upheld the convictions in an opinion written
by Justice Brennan which declared that the "dispositive question
is whether obscenity is utterance within the area of protected
speech and press." It made no difference, the Court said, that
the statutes in question punished incitation to impure sexual
thoughts, not shown to be related to any overt antisocial con-
duct, adding that the proper standard for defining obscenity as
used in these cases is: "whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."20 Lack
of precision is not offensive to the requirements of due process,
the Court observed, and this test gives "adequte warning of the
conduct prescribed and mark[s] . . . boundaries sufficiently
distinct for judges and juries fairly to administer the law . .. ."
He gave no indication as to what "contemporary community
standards" might encompass, thus leaving himself open to the
possible charge of relativism in moral matters.
On the same day, in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,2 7 Mr. Jus-
tice Brennan dissented from a decision which upheld a New
York statute providing for the enjoining of sales of obscene
books. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, held
that the state was entitled to use all its "weapons in the armory
of the law," including injunction, to protect its people against
pornography. In the Court's view, there was no more restraint
upon booksellers under the New York statute than under the
type of statutes in the Roth and A lberts cases. Mr. Justice Bren-
nan dissented on the ground that the New York statute made no
provision for trial by jury in an action thereunder.
(c) Refusal to Testify. Mr. Justice Brennan's thoughts on the
fifth amendment and those who would seek refuge behind it
25 ld. at 483.
26 Id. at 489.
27 354 .U.S. 436 (1957). Chief Justice Warren dissented, stating that the statute
:imposed al inyalid prior restraint. Justices Douglas and Black also dissented on theground that it gave the state the power of a censor and violated the first amendment.
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have been well expressed in several New Jersey .decisions. In
State v. Frary,28 he stated:
The privilege of a witness against being compelled to incrimi-
nate himself, of ancient origin, is precious to free men as a
restraint against high-handed and arrogant inquisitorial prac-
tices .... It has survived centuries of hot controversy periodi-
cally rekindled when there is popular impatience that its
protection sometimes allows the guilty to escape. It has endured
as a wise and necessary protection of the individual against
aribtrary power; the price of occasional failures of justice under
its protection is paid in the larger interest of the general personal
security ....
It is a fallacy, however, to regard the right of a witness to
remain mute when a criminating fact is inquired about as a
fixed barrier to the search of the judicial process for truth. The
barrier is up as to any question only when the witness himself
chooses to put it up, but the court, and not the witness, is the
ultimate arbiter whether the witness is entitled to the protection
of the privilege.29
In an earlier decision, In re Pillo,30 Mr. Brennan stated that:
"The federal decisions interpret and apply the privilege as in-
corporated in the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
That amendment does not apply to the several states." Addi-
tionally, "[T]he privilege against self-incrimination does not ex-
tend to protect the witness as to matters that may tend to
incriminate him under the laws of another jurisdiction. ' 31 And
finally, "The privilege, by unanimous authority, does not protect
against disclosure of facts in respect of which prosecution is
barred by lapse of time."32 According to Daniel M. Berman, 33
apparently referring to the Pillo decision, Mr. Justice Brennan
did not look too enthusiastically on refusal to testify:
In a 1952 case, for example, Brennan had to deal with the
privilege against self-incrimination. His opinion did not display
unbridled enthusiasm for the Fifth Amendment; he expressed
the belief that it serves to limit only the federal government. He
seemed to have no sympathy with Justice Black's theory that the
Fourteenth Amendment makes the entire Bill of Rights apply
to the States.
The Justice did have words of praise for the self-incrimina-
tion privilege, but they were merely disarming introductions to
28 19.N.J. 431, 117 A.2d 499 (1955). -
29 7d. at 501-02.
30 11 N.J. 8, 93 A.2d 176 (1952).
31 Id. at 180.
32 Id. at 181.
33 183 Nation 298 (1956). See also Berman, Mr. Justice Brennan; A Preliminary
Appraisal, 7 CATHoLIC U. L. REv. 1 (1958), which appeared subsequent to the
completion of this article.
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rulings that cut the heart out of it: The privilege protects
answers which might represent "any link in the chain which is
necessary to convict," but "it will not do. .. to permit a witness
to escape his obligations to provide his testimony for the state
upon extremely remote and speculative possibilities of danger."
We should interpret the privileges liberally "in light of its whole-
some service to the cause of personal freedom," but not
without regard to the public interest3 4
Cortese v. Cortese35 involved a paternity suit wherein the
mother refused to permit a blood test to be taken either of her-
self or of her child on the grounds of an invasion of the right of
personal privacy and an alleged unconstitutionality of a statute
providing for such blood tests. Mr. Brennan overruled her
objections and reversed a trial court which held for the mother.
"The discovery of truth" is the criterion to be followed. Mr.
Brennan stated:
[J]udicial discretion is not an arbitrary or personal discretion
to be exercised according to the whim or caprice of the individ-
ual judge; it is a mere legal discretion and he should use the
authority reposed in him when the essential requisites for its
exercise exist and the justice of the course is apparent ....
"The citizen holds his citizenship subject to the duty to
furnish to the courts, from time to time and within reasonable
limits, such assistance as the courts may demand of him in
their effort to ascertain truth in controversies before them."3 6
However, in several headlined cases before the Supreme
Court, Mr. Justice Brennan supported the right of witnesses
who refused to give testimony to legislative investigating com-
mittees. In Watkins v. United States,37 he joined a majority of
the Justices to reverse a conviction of contempt of Congress for
failure to answer questions posed by the House of Representa-
tives' Committee on Un-American Activities. The petitioner had
agreed to answer any questions about himself and about persons
still members of the Communist Party, but he refused to answer
questions about former members of the Party "who to my best
knowledge and belief have long since removed themselves from
the Communist movement." The latter questions, he contended,
were not relevant to the work of the committee.
After tracing the history of legislative investigations and the
power of the legislature to punish for contempt from medieval
34 Id. at 299.
35 10 N.J. Super, 152, 76 A.2d 717 (1950).
36 Id. at 720-21.
37 354 U.S. 178 (1957). Justice Clark dissented. Justices Burton and Whittaker
did not participate in the decision.
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times in England to the landmark cases of Kilbourn v. Thomp-
son,8 McGrain v. Daugherty,39 and Sinclair v. United States,40
the Court, in the opinion delivered by the Chief Justice, noted
that legislative investigations since World War II were of a
"new kind" which "involved a broad scale intrusion into the
lives and affairs of private citizens." 4
1
The Court quoted the resolution authorizing the creation of
the Un-American Activities Committee, noting that it was ex-
tremely broad and in essence gave the committee power to
define its own authority, a power so broad that it was impossible
to ascertain whether any legislative purpose was served by the
disclosures sought by the committee. 42 The statute under which
the petitioner was convicted imposed penalties for refusal to
answer "any question pertinent to the question under inquiry. ' 43
The vice, in this, the Court concluded, was that under the broad
language of the resolution creating the committee the petitioner
could not be sure what the "question under inquiry" was.44 In
the Court's view, the language of the committee chairman at the
hearings was equally vague,45 and the petitioner thus was not
accorded a fair opportunity to determine whether he was within
his rights in refusing to answer.
Mr. Justice Clark, however, vigorously dissented, arguing
that the powers of the Un-American Activities Committee were
no broader than the powers of any other coigressional com-
mittee40 and that the petitioner was fully informed of the subject
matter of the inquiry and had a complete understanding of the
hearings.47
In a similar case, this time dealing with the power of the
State of New Hampshire to punish for contempt during a legis-
lative investigation, Mr. Justice Brennan again supported the
individual's right to refuse to testify. Sweezy v. New Hamp-
shire.4 8 The investigation was carried out under a New Hamp-
shire statute which, in effect, makes the state's attorney general
a one-man legislative committee to investigate subversive activi-
38 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
39 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
40 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
41 354 U.S. 178, 195 (1957).
42 Id. at 201-04.
43 54 STAT. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1952).
44 354 U.S. at 209.
45 Id. at 214.
46 Id. at 220-22.
47 Id. at 226.
48 354 U.S. 234 (1957). Justices Frankfurter and Harlan concurred in the result,
but Justices Clark and Burton dissented.
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ties. Sweezy appeared twice before the attorney general and was
cb-operative for the most part although he denied the constitu-
tionality of many of the questions posed. He refused, however,
to answer any questions about the Progressive Party or certain
lectures he had given at the University of New Hampshire and
was judged guilty of contempt, the state supreme court affirming.
The judgment of the United States Supreme Court, reversing,
was announced by the Chief Justice, who also wrote an opinion
in which Mr. Justice Brennan and two others joined. Although
the appellant had not met the jurisdictional requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 1257(2),19 the Court treated his appeal as a petition
for writ of certiorari which it granted. This opinion discussed
at length the constitutional rights of witnesses before legislative
inquiries, stressing the point that the New Hampshire Supreme
Court had conceded that the witness' rights under the first and
fourteenth amendments had been abridged. However, the state
court viewed these rights as outweighed in this case by the
need of the legislative branch to be informed on a subject vital
to the preservation of the government. The majority opinion
of the United States Supreme Court, however, rested its reasons
for reversal on the ground that there was nothing to indicate that
the state legislature wanted the information that the attorney
general had sought. Without such a legislative desire, "the use
of the contempt power, notwithstanding the interference with
constitutional rights, was not in accordance with the due process
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment."'50 In a firm dissent
it was argued that the Court had no right to strike down state
action unless the interest in protecting the witness' rights was
greater than the state's interest in uncovering subversive activi-
ties, and the Court had made no such findings in this case.51
It is interesting to note in this connection that it was precisely
on this point that the late Senator Joseph McCarthy opposed
the confirmation of Mr. Brennan as Associate Justice. In his
statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee he said:
On the basis of that part of his record that I am familiar with,
I believe that Justice Brennan has demonstrated an underlying
49 "§ 1257. State courts; appeal; certiorari.
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in
which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:
"(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of-any
state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity."
50 354 U.S. at 254-55.
51 Id. at 269.
[VCol. XXXIIn
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN
hostility to congressional attempts to expose the Communist
conspiracy.
I can only conclude that his decisions on the Supreme Court
are likely to harm our efforts to fight communism.
I shall, therefore, vote against his confirmation unless, he is
able to persuade me today that I am not in possession of the
true facts with respect to his views.
I shall want to know if it is true that Justice Brennan, in his
public speeches, has referred to congressional investigations of
communism, for example, as "Salem witch hunts," and "inquisi-
tions," and has accused congressional investigating committees
of "barbarism."
I have evidence that he has done so. And such views, in my
opinion, reflect an utterly superficial understanding -putting
it mildly - of the Communist threat to our liberties, as well
as an underlying contempt for the Congress of the United
States.5 2
In response to Senator McCarthy's direct question whether
he approved of congressional investigations and exposures of
the Communist conspiracy, Mr. Justice Brennan replied un-
equivocally and spiritedly:
Not only do I approve, Senator, but personally I cannot think
of a more vital function of the Congress than the investigatory
function of its committees, and I can't think of a more import-
ant or vital objective of any committee investigation than that
of rooting out subversives in Government.53
But after prolonged discussion between the two, based upon
two of the Justice's speeches, the Senator remained "unconvinced
still." In a letter to the committee chairman, he stated:
[I] am convinced, after yesterday's session, that there is no
further doubt about the accuracy of my initial conclusion. I
believe that the written record of this committee now confirms
that Justice Brennan harbors an underlying hostility to con-
gressional attempts to investigate and expose the communist
conspiracy. 54
On the other hand, one of the regular members of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, Senator Arthur V. Watkins, who sat
throughout the questioning session, confidently reassured Mr.
52 Hearings on Nomination of William J. Brennan, Jr. Before the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1957). Another question of the
Senator's directed to Justice Brennan was whether he considered Communism merely
a political party or a criminal conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the
United States. Id. at 17-22. Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) which reversed the conviction of fourteen West Coast
Communists for conspiracy to violate the Smith Act. Justice Harlan's majority
view held that the Smith Act does not prohibit the teaching and advocacy of
forcible overthrow of the Government as. an abstract principle, I .
53 -Hearings on Nomination of William J. Brennan, Jr. Before the Senate Com-
mittee on the-Judlclary, 85th-Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1957).. .. ..
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Justice Brennan:
[I] have every confidence that you do have respect for the
power of the Congress to investigate, that you have cast no
reflection whatever on that power.
You may have said something that would indicate you were
not always in agreement with the way we did our job. A good
many Americans have that same point of view and I don't dis-
agree with them, although I am one of the investigators
as a member of the Internal Security Subcommittee. 55
(d) Right to Inspect Records. Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion
on the rights of private citizens to gain access to public records
was stated in Casey v. MacPhails:56
The general principle of the right of any citizen and taxpayer to
inspect and have access to public records when such inspection
and access can be had without undue interference with the
conduct of the public business is qualified not only by the
right in the judicial discretion of the trial judge to deny the
inspection or access when the motive is improper but also is
qualified by any enactments of the legislature which may bear
upon his right of use of the information57
In a later case Justice Brennan stated that this right of access
should be even stronger in a criminal case. In State v. Tune,58
involving a prosecution for murder wherein the accused was
denied access to his own confession, Mr. Brennan, in a self-
convinced dissent, stated:
It shocks my sense of justice that in these circumstances
counsel for an accused facing a possible death sentence should
be denied inspection of his confession which, were this a civil
case, could not be denied....
"To shackle counsel so that they cannot effectively seek out
the truth and afford the accused the representation which is
not his privilege but his absolute right seriously imperils our
bedrock presumption of innocence."59
This right to inspect records was pushed to the ultimate in
Justice Brennan's opinion in Jencks v. United States.60 Under-
lying this decision was the vexing problem of the Government's
reluctance to make public certain confidential information im-
,5 Id. at 39.
56 2 N.J. Super. 619, 65 A.2d 657 (1949).
57 Id. at 660.
58 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953).
59 Id. at 896-97.
60 353 U.S. 657 (1957). Justice Frankfurter joined the opinion of the Court
but noted that questions relating to instructions to the jury should have been dealt
with. Justice Burton, joined by Justice Harlan, concurred in the result but argued
the Court went too far. Documents should be produced for the trial court to
determine relevancy as well as applicability of privilege claimed by the Government.
[Vol. XXXIII
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN
portant to national security in a criminal prosecution based on
such information. Jencks was prosecuted for filing an allegedly
false non-Communist affidavit required by the Taft-Hartley Act;
the issue was whether, as a union officer, he swore falsely when
he executed an affidavit stating that he was not a member of
the Communist Party. The Government's case rested on cir-
cumstantial evidence and consisted principally of the testimony
of two former Communist Party members, Matusow and Ford,
who were undercover agents for the F.B.I. Jencks moved for
an order directing an inspection of the reports Ford and Matu-
sow made to the F.B.I. concerning Communist activities. The
Government opposed the motion on the sole ground that a
preliminary foundation was not laid to show inconsistency be-
tween the contents of the reports and the testimony of the wit-
nesses at the trial. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction,
"primarily upon that ground," to use the later language of the
Supreme Court.
In the Supreme Court decision, delivered by Mr. Justice
Brennan, the Court reversed, declaring that it was not necessary
to show a conflict between the reports and the testimony. "[A]
sufficient foundation was established by the testimony of Matu-
sow and Ford that their reports were of the events and activities
related in their testimony."'" The Court noted that "impeach-
ment of the testimony [of Ford and Matusow] was singularly
important 2 to Jencks.
Justice Brennan's opinion went on to say: "The practice of
producing government documents to the trial judge for his deter-
mination of relevancy and materiality, without hearing the ac-
cused, is disapproved."0 3 And he added rather forbiddingly:
We hold that the criminal action must be dismissed when the
Government, on the ground of privilege, elects not to comply
with an order to produce, for the accused's inspection and for
admission in evidence, relevant statements or reports in its
possession of government witnesses touching the subject matter
of their testimony at the trial.0 4
This overruling of the trial judge's discretion to determine
relevancy and Government privilege as to state secrets and the
identity of confidential informants provoked Mr. Justice Clark,
dissenting, to warn:
Unless the Congress changes the rule announced by the
81 Id. at 666.
82 Id. at 667.
88 Id. at 669.
e4 Id. at 672.
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Court today, those intelligence agencies of our Government
engaged in law enforcement may as well close up shop, for the
Court has opened their files to the criminal and thus afforded
him a Roman Holiday for rummaging through confidential
information as well as vital national secrets. 65
Perhaps it was the Jencks case, more than any other, which
prompted Frank B. Ober to conclude in a recent study of the
general trend of civil rights decisions under Chief Justice War-
ren who, with Justice Brennan and others, has joined Justices
Black and Douglas to make a new majority:
[T]he Court has once again extended the Bill of Rights to a
point where it presents great obstacles to the fight against Com-
munism which has been carried on by the Executive, Congress
and the states. True, some of its decisions may be distinguished
from the decisions of the Vinson Court on narrow grounds.
But the net effect of such decisions seems to subordinate the
national security to an extreme extension of civil liberties
through the due process clause and other provisions of the Bill
of Rights.66
(e) Due Process. Mr. Justice Brennan has always deter-
minedly struck down every effort to encroach even the slightest
degree upon the fundamental rights of all persons to due process
and a fair trial. In Palestroni v. Jacobs,67 a trial judge had
innocently furnished a dictionary to jurors, at their request, while
they were deliberating. This was done without prior notice to
the defendant or his counsel. Brennan held this to be prejudicial
error, stating:
The irregularity of the privy communication of the judge with
the jury must be deprecated in the strongest terms .... Such
communication borders perilously close in every case on an
infringement upon the litigant's basic right to due process and,
in particular circumstances, may in fact invade that right....
Moreover, the trial of a law suit is public business usually
to be conducted openly for all to see.68
However, Mr. Brennan would not tolerate or accept objec-
tions or appeals for reversals based on inconsequential grounds
or trivial reasons. In Ex Parte Graham,6 9 where the defendant
had been fairly tried and had been convicted.of incest but was
absent from the court when the verdict was returned, and had
the conviction reversed on that technical ground, Mr. Brennan
65 Id. at 681-82. Congress did promptly in some measure reverse the Jencks
case by enacting 71 STAT. 595, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3500 (Supp. 1957) to keep the F.B.I.
files confidential.
68 Ober, Communism and the Supreme Court, 44 A.B.A.T. 35, 89 (Jan. 1958).
67 10 N.J. Super. 266, 77 A.2d 183 (1950).
68 Id. at 184.
69 13 N.J. Super. 449, 80 A.2d 641 (1951).
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affirmed the conviction. This was not a case of violation of the
defendant's constitutional rights to confront witnesses or to make
a defense on the merits. Mr. Brennan stated:
And while, when testimony is presented or the jury is in-
structed, the accused has the right to be present because he is
entitled under the Constitution to confront the witnesses against
him and to make his defense upon the merits with the assistance
of counsel, . . .such reasons for his presence do not obtain
after the jury has concluded its deliberations, and those con-
stitutional provisions cannot be construed as requiring his
presence when the verdict is reported. 70
Mr. Justice Brennan was a pivotal figure in the rehearing of
Reid v. Covert71 which reversed two decisions upholding the
court-martialing of two servicemen's wives accused of murder-
ing their husbands. 712 He, together with Mr. Justice Harlan, who
had previously voted with the majority, joined the dissenters
from the previous year's decisions. On this rehearing, the Court
ruled that civilian dependents of American military personnel
stationed abroad are not subject to trial by court martial. The
opinion of the new majority held unconstitutional Article 2(11 )
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, rejecting the idea that
"when the United States acts against citizens abroad it can do
so free of the Bill of Rights.17 3 The Government had contended
that Article 2(11) could be sustained by legislation "necessary
and proper" to carry out the United States' obligations under
the Status of Forces Agreement with Great Britain and a similar
agreement with Japan. The opinion replied that, "The obvious
and decisive answer to this, of course, is that no agreement with
a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any
branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the
Constitution. '7
4
In two other cases before the Supreme Court involving mili-
tary justice, Mr. Justice Brennan wrote dissenting opinions in
70 Id. at 643.
71 354 U.S. 1 (1957). Six members of the Court agreed that civilian dependents
of members of the Armed Forces overseas could not constitutionally be tried by a
court martial in times of peace for capital offences committed abroad. Justices
Frankfurter and Hailan, in their opinions, limited iheir holdings to capital cases,
while Chief Justice Warren mid Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan, in an opinion
by Justice Black, expressed the broad view that the military trial of civilians is in-
consistent with the Constitution.
72 Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956) and Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487
(1956). Five members of the Court held Article 2 (11) of the UCMJ constitutional
and that consequently the court martial had jurisdiction. Chief Justice Warren and
Justices Black and Douglas dissented. Justice Frankfurter reserved decision.
71 354 U.S. at 5.
74 Id. at 16.
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which the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Black, and Mr. Justice
Douglas joined, Jackson v. Taylor75 and Fowler v. Wilkinson."0
In both cases, involving the crimes of premeditated murder and
attempted rape, the petitioners contended that the Army Board
of Review had no power to impose an original sentence. The
majority of the Court rejected the contention, holding that it
exercised" 'no supervisory power over the courts which enforce
[military] law. . . .' If there is injustice in the sentence imposed
it is for the Executive to correct, for since the board of review
has authority to act, we have no jurisdiction to interfere with the
exercise of its discretion. ' 77 But Mr. Justice Brennan saw the
action of the board of review as an original imposition of
sentence. He quoted with approval Judge Major's opinion in
the similar DeCosta v. Madigan:78
Imposition of sentence by the proper authority is an essential
step in administration of criminal justice. Here, under the sta-
tute, only the court-martial was authorized to take this step; it
failed to do so.79
Another example of Mr. Justice Brennan's conception of due
process is found in In re Groban.8 0 The question presented was
whether the appellants had a constitutional right to the assist-
ance of counsel when they appeared as witnesses at an investiga-
tion conducted by the Ohio State Fire Marshal. The Supreme
Court affirmed the Ohio Court of Appeals refusal to grant
petitioners habeas corpus after they had been found guilty of
contempt for refusing to be sworn or testify without their
counsel. To the majority of the Court, the petitioners' situation
was considered analogous to that of witnesses before a grand
jury. For these persons there is no constitutional right to the
assistance of counsel. The Court pointed out that the Fire
Marshal's investigation was not a criminal proceeding nor an
adjudication. Mr. Justice Brennan joined the Chief Justice and
Mr. Justice Douglas in a strong dissent delivered by Mr. Justice
Black.
2. Management - Labor
With reference to strikes, collective bargaining, and seizure,
Mr. Brennan's views were succinctly expressed in an address
to the Essex County Bar Association on April 1, 1946.1
75 353 U.S. 569 (1957).
76 353 U.S. 583 (1957).
77 Id. at 584.
78 223 F.2d 906 (7th Cir. 1955).
79 353 U.S. at 582.
80 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
81 69 N.J.LJ. 145-48 (May 9, 1946).
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In the first place, I do not believe that all strikes are bad.
I think that an industrial democracy inevitably must have
some of them when free collective bargaining doesn't resolve
differences. Strikes, with the exception, perhaps, of stoppages
in industries of vital public importance, such as utilities, are
not too great a penalty for industrial freedom. The alternative
is solution of disputes by government fiat and that is a dead
end road destructive of the interests of management and worker
alike.
Again in International Ass'n of Machinists, Ind. v. Bergen
Ave. Bus Owners' Ass'n,12 Mr. Brennan stated: "The sanctions
of seizure and compulsory arbitration and the attendant pro-
hibitions of stoppages and strikes are invoked only when the
paramount public interest is threatened by an actual or imminent
interference. ... "
However, in the address before the Essex County Bar Asso-
ciation, Mr. Brennan had words of caution for labor and
warned of a tendency toward abuse of power:
I say to labor that, unless they will join those who sincerely
respect and accept labor's important place in our future to
effect correctives which will do no more than assure an equal
balance and wipe out known abuses of labor's power, the forces
which in fact would destroy free labor (and they include the
left and the right), will win the day and labor, not management,
will be the greater loser.84
Mr. Brennan made a very prophetic statement in that address:
No reflective American can doubt that the time has arrived
when we must have some remedial legislation which recognizes
the changes of the last ten years in labor's influence in our
national life. Its present day great strength and power and the
evidences we see toward abuse of that power, cry out for some
measure of control.8
An interesting Supreme Court opinion in this regard found
Mr. Justice Brennan on April 1, 1957, holding that members
of an employers' bargaining association did not commit an unfair
labor practice when, during negotiations for a new contract
with the union, they temporarily locked out their employees
as a defense against a union strike called against one of their
members. NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union.8 In reversing
a court of appeals decision which found the employers guilty
of an unfair labor practice on the ground that a lockout could
be justified only if there were facts showing unusual economic
82 3 N.J. Super. 558, 67 A.2d 362 (1949).
83 Id. at 365.
84 69 N.J.L.J. 146 (May 9, 1946).
85 Ibid.
86 353 U.S. 87 (1957). ,
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hardship, Mr. Justice Brennan made it plain that the Court
was deciding a narrow question: whether a temporary lockout
is lawful as a defense to a union strike tactic that threatened
the destruction of the employer's interest in bargaining on a
group basis. He noted that preservation of the integrity of the
multi-employer bargaining unit is a circumstance under which
employers' may lawfully resort to the lockout as an economic
weapon.
3. Monopoly and "Bigness"
Mr. Justice Brennan delivered a trade regulation decision of
far-reaching consequence on June 3, 1957, when he ruled that
the acquisition of the stock of a customer corporation may be
just as violative of anti-trust laws as the acquisition of the stock
of a competing corporation. United States v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co.87
The fundamental issue in the case was whether the "com-
manding position" which du Pont occupied as the supplier of
automotive fabrics and finishes to General Motors Corporation
was gained because of its competitive merit or through its own-
ership of twenty-three percent of General Motors' stock. The
district court had dismissed the Government's complaint that
du Pont had used its stock in General Motors "to channel Gen-
eral Motors' purchases to du Pont." In reversing, the Supreme
Court's decision, based upon the Clayton Act, rejected the argu-
ment that the statute applied only to "horizontal" stock acquisi-
tions, saying that the FTC's failure to apply the statute to "ver-
tical" acquisitions was not a binding administrative interpreta-
tion. The statute applies, the Court declared, "whenever the
reasonable likelihood appears that the acquisition will result in
a restraint of commerce or in the creation of a monopoly of
any line of commerce."
After a fascinating review of the history of the relationship
between two of the country's largest corporations from the
time of du Pont's original purchase of General Motors' stock in
1917, Mr. Justice Brennan concluded:
The fact that sticks out. . . is that the bulk of du Pont's pro-
duction has always supplied the largest part of the requirements
of one customer in the automobile industry connected to du
Pont by a stock interest. The inference is overwhelming that
87 353 U.S. 586 (1957). Justice Brennan was joined in his opinion by the Chief
Justice and Justices Black and Douglas. Justices:Burtdn and Frankfurter dissented,
holding the majority erred in applying the Clayton Act vertically. Justices Clark,
Harlan, and Whittaker did not participate.
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du Pont's commanding position was prompted by its stock
interest and was not gained solely on competitive merit.88
Fortune magazine, commenting on Mr. Justice Brennan's
opinion, interpreted it as the expression of a philosophy of
"Anti-Bigness:"
Justice Brennan's -sweeping assertion of the government's
right to outlaw intercorporate relationships of long standing -
even where no monopoly exists and where none is alleged-
immensely strengthened the Clayton Acf. Indeed, it is difficult
to see why the Justice Department should henceforth trouble
to prove monopoly or restraint as required under the Sherman
Act when it can achieve the same end simply by showing
the possibility of restraint under the newly interpreted Clayton
Act. As New Deal brain-truster Adolf Berle puts it, "The
Supreme Court has made a new law."
The Brennan "law," stripped of its literary flights (e.g., "the
fire kindled in 1917 continues to smolder"), is basically an
anti-bigness law. Professor S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, co-
chairman of the Attorney General's Committee to Study the
Anti-Trust Laws, says: "The implications are far-reaching and
seem to imply a philosophical issue: anti-bigness."89
It is interesting to note, however, that in an earlier anti-trust
case, Radovich v. National Football League,90 wherein the Court
extended the Sherman Anti-trust Act to organized football's
standard player contract, Justice Brennan was not so radical,
electing to abide by stare decisis. Radovich, a former guard
for the Detroit Lions, brought suit for treble damages under
the Sherman Act, alleging a conspiracy to monopolize com-
merce in professional football. The district court dismissed the
complaint, relying on the 1922 decision in Federal Baseball Club
v. National League9 and Toolson v. New York Yankees,9" decid-
ed in 1953, both dealing with professional baseball and holding
it a sport and not a business. In reversing the district court, the
Supreme Court made no effort to draw any distinction between
professional baseball and professional football insofar as the
Sherman Act is concerned, saying in effect that the decision in
the Federal Baseball case was of dubious validity and would
not be extended beyond the sport of baseball.
Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice Brennan, -dissented,
saying that'he could not distinguish baseball from football under
the rational of the preceding cases, and that unless Congress
88 Id. at 605.
89 Fortune, July 1957, pp. 91-92.
90 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
91 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
92 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
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changed the law, the rule of the Federal Baseball case should
be applied to professional football.
B. ADJECTIVE REMEDIES
1. Congestion in the Courts
A graduate of the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce
of the University of Pennsylvania, with a degree in Economics,
Mr. Justice Brennan has always approached legal problems with
a direct business-like approach. In his article, Does Business
Have a Role in Improving Judicial Administration?, the general
formula is stated simply:
I have been preaching a long time to all who will listen that
the intelligent application of the principles of business man-
agement . . . will cure most of the problems of organization,
processes and management which are plaguing the courts of
our land.
The business of our courts is very big business indeed. The
stuff of that business is, of course, litigation. The volume of
litigation is increasing enormously and, at least in the larger
states, the courts, state and federal, are bogging down under
the strain. Calendar congestion is a problem of such gravity
at some places as to threaten an actual breakdown in the
administration of justice itself....
' ' * In New Jersey there is no problem of calendar conges-
tion in any court of the state.... How was it done? Simply by
applying principles of business management. . . Simply by
abandoning an archaic system of 17 virtually autonomous courts
and substituting an integrated court system operated much as a
business corporation under rules of practice and administration
devised by the Supreme Court as the Board of Directors and
supervised by the Chief Justice as Executive Head, assisted
by a presiding judge in each county functioning much like the
branch head of any far-flung business.93
Using New Jersey as a paradigm, five business-like procedures
are proposed by Mr. Justice Brennan to guarantee the elimina-
tion of court congestion: first, simplified rules of practice; second,
an administrative director of the court; third, weekly work
reports by the judges; fourth, assignment of justices by the
chief justice; and fifth, pretail discovery and mandatory pre-
trial conferences.
(a) Rules of Practice. The adoption by the state courts of
the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure is strongly
recommended and their use extolled. In his article, After Eight
Years New Jersey Judicial Reform, Mr. Justice Brennan ob-
served:
93 28 PENN. B.A.Q. 238 (1957).
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The Federal Rules represented the most comprehensive, the
most flexible, the most modern existing set of rules to accom-
plish the objective of ruling the disposition of particular cases
according to the merits and to prevent their disposition for mere
procedural reasons. Those rules represented years and years of
work of outtanding experts and reflected the thoughtful criti-
cisms of individual lawyers throughout the country. 94
(b) An Administrative Director of the Courts. The provision
for an Administrative Director of the Courts is also enthusiasti-
cally urged. In his article, New Jersey Tackles Court Congestion,
Mr. Brennan briefly described the functions of such an Admin-
istrator:
He and his staff perform the task without which efficient admin-
istration would be impossible. His office keeps a perpetual
inventory of the case load in all the courts and collects and
interprets the other pertinent statistical data which show the
trouble spots where action is necessary. He also is continually
studying operations and developing' procedures the better and
more efficiently to process court business. 95
(c) Weekly Reports by Judges. The use of weekly reports
by the judges to equalize work loads also helps to avoid court
congestion and minimize legal delays. In an address delivered to
the Chicago Bar Association, November 27, 1956, on The
Congested Calendar in Our Courts - The Problem Can be
Solved, Mr. Brennan stated:
Every judge of the state files a weekly report of his week's
activities with the Administrative Director. That report shows
his hours on the bench each day, the names of the causes
handled during the day and the time given to each ...
If the judge reserves decision in any matter, he notes the fact
on his weekly report and on each subsequent weekly report
until the matter is decided. If the office of the Administrative
Director notes that the decision is reserved for an undue length
of time, an inquiry of the judge for a reason usually results in
its prompt disposition. This device has been a valuable contri-
bution toward the goal of minimizing unnecessary delays in
handing down of decisions made by the judge rather than by
the jury.9 6
(d) The Assignment Power of the Chief Justice. The assign-
ment power of the Chief Justice of the state court is a most
delicate and important duty towards the lessening of court
congestion. This duty is defined by Mr. Brennan in his article,
New Jersey Tackles Court Congestion, as:
[T]he power vested by the Constitution in the Chief Justice to
assign judges of the Superior and County Courts wherever in
94 43 A.B.A.J. 499 (1957).
95 40 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 45, 46 (1956).
96 38 CHi. B. Rzc. 103, 105 (1956).
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the state the work load requires more judicial manpower to
keep lists current and the judges can be spared from the
counties where they are regularly assigned. 97
(e) Pretrial Discovery and Mandatory Pretrial Conferences.
This is a feature in favor of which Mr. Brennan has freely con-
fessed to having what is perhaps an arbitrary prejudice and
almost a closed mind to any argument opposing the mandatory
requirement. In his article on Pretrial Procedure in New Jersey
a Demonstration, Mr. Brennan stated:
The key for the attainment of that ideal is, we think, proper
pretrial discoverey and pretrial procedures. The curtain, which
under our former practice effectively hid from each party the
true nature of his adversary's claim or defense until the trial,
is torn aside by the discovery and pretrial conference procedures
to permit each party, as soon as the issue is joined, and long
before the trial date, to probe virtually without limit into the
case of the other side, both to strengthen his own and to learn
the true nature and the strengths and weaknesses of the other's
case. He obtains the names of the other party's witnesses under
our procedures and may take depositions of those witnesses or
propound interrogatories to them. The ideal of a determination
in every case according to right and justice on the merits is
obviously furthered by a procedure which exposes the whole
case for both sides to see and evaluate before the date of ulti-
mate decision.9s
A further discussion of pretrial procedures is noted in Mr.
Brennan's article in Federal Rules Decisions,99 wherein exact
procedures and applications of pretrial rules are described in
great particularity.
Mr. Brennan's basic philosophy regarding legal procedures
is summed up in his dissent in State v. Tune:100 "Discovery,
basically a tool for truth, is the most effective device yet devised
for the reduction of the aspect of the adversary element to a mini-
mum."' 0 ' An example of the importance of the pretrial proce-
dures is noted in Evtush v. Hudson Bus Transportation Co.,10'
in which Mr. Brennan concurred in the reversal of a trial court
decision wherein, during pretrial procedure, the defendants in
answering plaintiff's interrogatory stated that they had only two
witnesses. However, at trial they produced a third witness who
was permitted to testify. The appellate court found this to be
97 40 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 45 (1956).
98 28 N.Y.S.B. ButL. 442, 444 (1956).
99 17 F.R.D. 437 (1955).
100 13 N.J. 203, 229, 98 A.2d 881 (1953).
101 Id. at 895.
102 10 N.J. Super. 45, 76 A.2d 263 (1950).
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prejudicial error. Discovery must be complete and the substantial
rights of the parties must be protected.
2. Legal Conduct
(a) In Court. Justice Brennan's stern attitude on the proper
conduct of attorneys and judges in court was shown in Strom-
ing v: Stromning,' 3 when he deplored certain activities in the
lower court. In Judge Brennan's opinion even the judge was
rebuked.
Many of the exchanges with counsel and the court's examina-
tion of appellant display the use by the judge of a regrettable
acerbity of language and an impatience of attitude toward the
appellant which should have been avoided despite their provo-
cation in many instances by the unwarranted persistence of
appellant's counsel in pressing his position after adverse rulings.
It must be borne in mind that, in the effectual maintenance
of a strong and independent court system, the, appearance as
well as the actuality of fair and impartial judicial administration
must at all times be sought. . ,'. The judge and counsel, as
well as officers of the court, share the responsibility for the
faithful and meticulous performarice. of this high duty.' 0 4
(b) In Public. His strict concern for the conduct of officers
of the court extends even to their actions and demeanor in
public. In In re Howell,10 5 he specially concurred in a per
curiam decision suspending an attorney from the practice of
law for six months for having committed a simple assault and
battery upon a newspaper editor. This was a violation of the
Canons of Professional Ethics:
A lawyer who attempts to avenge real or fancied personal
grievances by resort to a personal code offensive to the criminal
laws is deficient in that degree of fair private and professional
character that the public rightly expects of every member of
the bar. His office is a very badge of respectability and his
conduct sullies the office. He invites and" merits stern and just
condemnation. . . . His conduct perforce imperils not him
alone but the honor and integrity of his profession which
depends for its very existence upon public trust and confidence.
• . . Discipline must be imposed not primarily to punish him
but to give assurance to the public that the profession-is deserv-
ing of its trust ind confidence and will derhand that all attorneys
meticulously adhere to the high standards! imposed by the pro-
fession upon itself,10 .
3. Legal Aid
Mr. Brennan firmly believes in the establishment of an
103 12 NJ. Super. 217, 79 A.2d 492 (1951).
104 Id., at 493.
105 .10 N.J. 139, 89 A.2d 652 .(1952)...
106 Id. at 654. ..
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organized Legal Aid by the community. As stated in his address
at the 4th Annual Meeting of the Monmouth County Legal Aid
Society:
The heart and core of the Legal Aid idea is simply stated. Its
object is to make it impossible for any man, woman or child
in the United States to be denied the equal protection of the
laws simply because he or she is poor.
The very foundation upon which a democracy is founded
and without which it must inevitably fail is that equal justice
shall be available to all citizens.
When only the rich can enjoy the law, as a doubtful luxury,
and the poor, who need it most, cannot have it because its
expense puts it beyond their reach, the threat to the continued
existence of a free democracy is not imaginary, it is very real,
because democracy's very life depends upon making the ma-
chinery of justice so effective that every citizen shall believe in
and benefit by its impartiality and fairness.107
4. Construction and Interpretation of Laws
His view of the construction and interpretation of statutes
was well expressed in MacPhail v. Board,108 in which he stated:
The canon of construction applicable here is that recently pro-
nounced by the Supreme Court in Hackensack Water Co. v.
Ruta, 3 N.J. 139, at page 147, 69 A.2d 321, 325 (1949) where
it is said: "We gather the sense of a law from its object and
the nature of the subject matter and the whole of the context
and the acts in pari materia. The parts of the Statute are to be
reviewed in relation to the whole and the motive which leads
to the making of the law, and reconciled, if possible, to carry
out the reasonably probable legislative policy. The general
intention of the act controls the interpretation of its parts.
"109
It is inspiring to note that in the course of the hearings on his
nomination to the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Brennan patiently
endured a gruelling examination by the committee chairman,
Senator James 0. Eastland, with regard to his personal con-
ception of the Constitution, its meaning and construction, as
well as of his understanding of the value of legal precedents and
extra-legal writings. In the face of obviously leading inquiries as
to his general judicial philosophy, Mr. Justice Brennan pre-
sented with restraint his admirable notion of the difficult role
of the judge in interpreting laws. Although at first glance the
107 15 LEGAL Am BRIEF CASE 75 (1956).
108 6 N.J. Super. 613, 70 A.2d 508 (1950).
109 Id. at 511-12.
110 Hearings on Nomination of William J. Brennan, Jr. Before the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 36-38 (1957).
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following transcript" ° of that penetrating interchange may seem
overly long, it is eminently worth reviewing:
The Chairman. Do you agree that it is a sound rule of consti-
tutional law in construing the Constitution of the United States
that the Constitution and amendments thereto have a fixed and
definite meaning when they are adopted?
Mr. Brennan. I don't know, Senator, that I could answer that
question categorically. I don't think I can. The question of the
application of the Constitution and . . . the laws of the Con-
gress come before the Court in every instance in a particular
fact setting and all I -
The Chairman. It is an elemental principle, is it not, of
constitutional law that an amendment to the Constitution has
a fixed, definite meaning when it is adopted and that that mean-
ing does not change at a liter time?
Mr. Brennan, Again, Senator, I don't think I could answer
that categorically because the application of the Constitution
and of its amendments as well indeed as the interpretation of
laws always involve their application in respect to particular
facts ....
The Chairman. Well, now, what are the rules then to deter-
mine the construction of an amendment to the Constitution of
the United States or to the Constitution itself?
Mr. Brennan. Senator, as I have suggested there is a great
body of precedent that deals with every amendment as well as
with every provision. I don't suppose there is a single provision
or clause indeed of the main Constitution or of any of its
amendments which hasn't at one time or another been the
subject of litigation in which certain determinations have been
made....
The Chairman. Then you think that the meaning of the Con-
stitution should be determined by the expressed provisions and
by the precedents?
Mr. Brennan. I think that is right, sir. ... [O]f course prece-
dents change too as you know, Senator.
The Chairman. Certainly. What is a precedent?
Mr. Brennan. . . . I don't think I can answer that. I mean I
can answer that any prior determination of the Court is a prece-
dent.
The Chairman. Do you think that a book written by some
college professor could be a precedent?
Mr. Brennan. There again, Senator, there have been prece-
dents for reliance upon many materials in the determinations
of cases before us. That has been done of course throughout the
history of the Court.
The Chairman. You don't think then that a college professor
when the current theories of psychology and sociology change
that that changes the Constitution of the United States; do you?
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Mr. Brennan. Well, of course it doesn't change the Constitu-
tion of the United States, Senator, but -
The Chairman. It couldn't change the meaning of the Con-
stitution.
Mr. Brennan. But what I am trying to make clear is in the
search in any case for the right decision, necessarily judges...
consult a lot of things which may bear upon the particular case
that is before you for decision. I think that is the judicial
process, not only in the United States Supreme Court, but in
every court. Certainly it was the process in the court on which I
sat in New Jersey.
The Chairman. Do you think the Constitution of the United
States could have one meaning this week and another meaning
next week?
Mr. Brennan. I think that puts it in a rather narrow compass,
Senator. The application of the Constitution is a problem of
applying to living matter, cases that come before us. Where
the differences often arise is in, like fingerprints, it is hard to
say that any two cases are always alike. Rarely does that ever
happen. All I can say for myself, Senator, is that as I have tried
to do ever since I have been a judge, that is with an approach
of disinterestedness if I may phrase it that way, conscientiously
to the best of my ability to apply the law whether the applicable
law is constitutional, legislative, or common law or otherwise to
the facts of the given case that is before us.
V. CONCLUSION
At the conclusion of the Senate hearings on Mr. Justice Bren-
nan's appointment, Senator Alexander Wiley, of Wisconsin, said
to the committee chairman and to Justice Brennan:
I was very favorably impressed with the Justice's statements
yesterday. He realizes very, apparently we are living in a chang-
ing world. The Court has definitely spoken about the resulting
powers and we have exercised it for a number of years. The
Constitution is a living institution, it is not meant to be a dead
thing .... "I
At present, Justice Brennan's juristic philosophy cannot be
absolutely categorized. His flexibility and complexity render each
of his decisions forceful and exciting. When one attempts to re-
concile his various decisions and thus piece out his philosophy
inconsistencies appear. But this is no doubt due to his insistence
upon giving paramount importance to the facts of each individual
case. "The Law," Justice Brennan says, "is not an end in itself,
nor does it provide ends; it is pre-eminently a means to serve
what we think is right.""' 2
Ill Id. at 38.
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What the Justice fails to add is that, while the law does not
provide ends, the judges do. Apparently, he recognizes this to
some degree, for he is a foe of legal "isolationism." He defends
the use by lawyers and the courts of truth wherever it can be
found, even in the findings of social sciences such as economics,
sociology, and social psychology. In answer to those who have
criticized the Supreme Court for citing non-legal works in its
1954 decision outlawing school segregation, Mr. Justice Bren-
nan would say:
The mind of the layman unfamiliar with the judicial process
supposes it to exist in the air, as a self-justifying and wholly
independent process. The opposite is of course true, that
judicial decision must be nourished by all the insights that
scholarship can furnish and legal scholarship must in turn be
nourished by all the disciplines that comprehend the totality of
human experience.113
Mr. Justice Brennan would urge lawyers. to "turn their minds
to the knowledge and experience of the other disciplines, and in
particular to those disciplines that investigate and report on the
functioning and nature of. society."" 4 However, a serious word
of caution should be added. In the search to solve the great
problems of our day, viz., the reconciliation of freedom with
responsibility, of the desires of the individual with the good of the
community, of the interests of the nation with the requirements
of international amity, and, in general, the balancing of personal
ambition with the moral demands of human nature, a lawyer and
certainly a jurist may not rely solely upon the descriptive social
sciences, as helpful as they are. Rather, one must supplement his
factual, positivistic knowledge with interpretative and principled
learning. The normative social sciences, such as individual and
social ethics, political and economic philosophy, and general
moral philosophy, must be incorporated into legal learning or
else there will be anarchic, disjointed, unrelated, unpredictable
results. Mr. Jusfice Brennan undoubtedly recognizes this. When
he actually accomplishes it, he will become, with his great legal
potential, one of America's outstanding jurists.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
